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3ABSTRACT
We study the starting resources of start-ups, which develop and market new products or
services based upon a proprietary technology or skill. We define these companies as research-
based start-ups (RBSUs). We look at how technological, financial and human resources at
founding cluster together to form different starting resource configurations. Using a unique
hand-collected dataset of RBSUs in Belgium, we find four different types of starting
configurations: “Venture Capital-backed start-ups,” “Prospectors,” “Product start-ups” and
“Transitional start-ups”. This study shows that these different types of starting resource
configurations are not only empirically distinct but can also be conceptually explained by
internal factors such as the entrepreneurial orientation at start-up and external factors such as
the origin of the firm and the characteristics of the industry in which the firm competes.
4INTRODUCTION
Research-based start-ups (RBSUs) are new business start-ups, which develop and
market new products or services based upon a proprietary technology or skill. RBSUs have
received a great deal of attention from academics in the last two decades (e.g. Utterback et al.,
1988; Roberts, 1991; Autio & Yli-Renko 1998; Shane, 2001). These studies revealed that
RBSUs, or New Technology-Based Firms (NTBFs) in more general, contribute significantly
to an economy in terms of exports, employment, taxes paid, research and development, and
innovations (Utterback et al., 1988) and play an important role in bringing new technologies
to the market  (Henderson, 1993; Christensen, 1997).
In this study, we explore whether we can distinguish dominant starting resource
configurations among RBSUs. This research is attractive from a practical and a theoretical
viewpoint. Firstly from a practical standpoint, there is a clear need for a multi-dimensional
resource-based typology of RBSUs. Roberts (1991) found that different types of resources of
RBSUs are linked and that the interrelationship alters the relationship between individual
resources and firm performance. Chandler & Hanks (1998) found that human and financial
capital appear to be substitutable. Most researchers, however, do not control for possible
interaction effects between different types of resources. Without a deep understanding about
resource typologies, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions and recommendations from
research on RBSUs. Secondly, we want to contribute to the Resource-Based View (RBV)
theory. A future challenge for RBV-scholars is to answer ‘how’ questions such as “How do
resources interact/ compare with other resources?” (Priem & Butler, 2001).
In order to examine how different types of resources relate to each other, we use
cluster analysis procedures to distinguish dominant patterns in starting resources and to
develop a resource-based taxonomy of RBSUs. Implicit in this line of thinking is a belief that
the search for a resource-based explanation of firm performance without an understanding of
how resources relate to each other leads to conflicting theories of firm performance. Next, we
analyze how different starting resource configurations are related to differences in
technological domain, industry characteristics, organizational origin and entrepreneurial
orientation. These analyses can also be seen as testing the external validity of the clusters. If
the clusters do not differ on variables not used in the cluster analysis, they are unlikely to
represent distinct empirical categories (Ketchen & Shook, 1996).
5LITERATURE REVIEW
Starting Resource Configurations
Several scholars studied different characteristics of RBSUs at start-up such as the
financial resources (Roberts, 1991; Hellmann & Puri, 2000ab; Manigart et al., 2002), personal
characteristics of the founders or entrepreneurial team (Utterback et al., 1988; Roberts, 1991,
p. 47 – 99; Feeser & Willard, 1990; Shane, 2001; Shane & Stuart, 2002; Burton et al. 2002),
and the technology (Utterback et al., 1988). These studies show that “starting resources” is a
multidimensional construct and RBSUs differ considerably along different resource
dimensions.
The next step towards a better understanding of starting resources is to capture major
patterns in this variation while making abstraction of other factors. One popular response to
this challenge has been to identify “organizational configurations”: groups of firms sharing a
common profile of organizational characteristics (Meyer et al., 1993; Miller & Mintzberg,
1984). Examination of organizational configurations has been conducted under many labels,
including strategic groups (Hatten and Schendel, 1977), organizational typologies (Miles and
Snow, 1978), taxonomies (Galbraith and Schendel, 1983), and archetypes (Miller and Friesen,
1980). Regardless of the specific label, the underlying assumption is that configurations
represent a way to meaningfully capture the complexity of organizational reality and to
understand the relationship between organizations and their environments and performance
outcomes (Ketchen et al., 1997).
We position this study in the resource-based-view (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt,
1984; Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001; Teece et al., 1997). The RBV tradition argues that
firm-specific resources and capabilities, which are both rare and valuable, determine the
competitive advantage of a firm. When such resources are simultaneously not imitable (i.e.
they cannot easily be replicated by competitors), not substitutable (i.e. other resources cannot
fulfill the same function), and not transferable (i.e. they cannot be purchased in resource
markets), those resources may produce a competitive advantage that is long lived (i.e.
sustainable).
Most empirical research has studied one or more types of resources at one point in
time and independently from each other and analyzed the relation between one type of
resources and performance. Such a static approach fails to appreciate the interaction effects of
different types of resources and overlooks the dynamism of the system. However, RBV
6theorists acknowledge that resources may become specialized to others and evolve in a
dynamic system (Mosakowski, 1993; Teece et al., 1997).  Recently, resource-based scholars
have begun thinking about methods to study resources as a dynamic system (Brush et al.,
2001; Chandler & Hanks, 1998).  We argue that if resources are indeed linked to each other
then one should be able to distinguish different types of resource configurations. In order to
explore this, we use cluster analysis procedures to develop a starting resource-based
taxonomy of RBSUs.
Critical Starting Resources for RBSUs
The most fundamental step in cluster analysis is the selection of variables along which
to group firms. We use a combination of a deductive and cognitive approach to identify the
appropriate variables for this study. Firstly, we follow the RBV theory to select a framework
of different types of resources. Secondly, we use the perceptions of expert informants, i.e.
founders of RBSUs, to select the cluster variables.
To examine the variation in starting resources, we adopt the general, often used
classification of Barney (1991). Barney classifies resources into 4 dimensions: financial,
physical, human and organizational resources. In order to focus on the most important
resources for RBSUs and select the specific measures for each type of resource, we use
insights from our field study. The first question in the interviews was open-ended and asked
the founder to tell in general terms about “How the firm was started?” Most founders
spontaneously talked about their technology or product, the founding team and the financing.
This enhances our confidence that these three resource dimensions are appropriate to explore
starting resource configurations. To derive a resource-based taxonomy, we don’t take into
account organizational resources, because founders almost never talked spontaneously about
them and RBV theory argues that this type of resources is not elaborated at start-up. However,
we acknowledge that some aspects of organizational resources, such as the firms’
entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), may vary among start-ups. Therefore,
we study in the second part of this paper how heterogeneity in entrepreneurial orientation
relates to different starting resource configurations.
In the following paragraphs we briefly discuss the financial, physical and human
resources and give a RBV explanation for the specific aspects we use to develop a resource-
based taxonomy of RBSUs. Financial resources include all the different money resources that
firms can use such as capital from the entrepreneurs, from equity investors and debtors. A
7start-up that invests disproportionately more financial resources early on is likely to
accumulate a larger stock of strategic assets than peer ventures that lack the financial
resources at founding (Lee et al., 2001). Several scholars argue that a lack of financial
resources is a key component of the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) which starters
face (Schoonhoven et al., 1990). Therefore, we argue that the amount of financial resources at
founding can be a source of competitive advantage for RBSUs. We take into account the total
amount of starting capital and the debt ratio of the firm during the first year. Next, we also
distinguish between firms that raised capital form venture capital firms (VCs) during the first
year and those that did not. Besides money, VCs also provide legitimacy, management know-
how and financial expertise (Hellmann & Puri, 2000b).  Hence, venture capital involvement at
founding might be a source of competitive advantage.
Physical resources include the physical technology used in the firm, a firm’s plant and
equipment, its geography and its access to raw materials. By definition RBSUs are companies
whose mission is to develop and market technologically new or improved products, services
or processes. Hence, the technical resources are mostly the most important aspect of physical
resources compared to access to raw materials and plant and manufacturing. Further, we keep
the geographic location constant in this study (see method section). Hence, in this study, we
focus on the technology resources - as a type of physical resources. Empirically, we found
that RBSUs differ considerably along three dimensions of technology resources and RBV
thinking indicates that these three dimensions might be important sources of competitive
advantage. Firstly, RBSUs are not in the same stage of the product-development cycle at
founding, because the extent of pre-founding efforts varies considerably among firms.
Entrepreneurs may develop a technology/ product while working at a prior employer and
transfer this technology/product to the start-up. These pre-founding efforts may give the start-
up a competitive advantage over firms that start from scratch. Therefore, we consider the
stage of development of the firm’s core product at founding as an important starting resource.
Next, RBSUs differ in the scope of their product-technology. Some firms develop one specific
product, while others develop broad platforms, which can serve as the base for several
products (Meyer at al., 1997). Thirdly, RBSUs differ considerably in the newness or
innovativeness of their core technology and innovativeness can be an important way for start-
ups to differentiate themselves from incumbents and might be an important source for
competitive advantage (Schumpeter, 1934; Lee et al, 2001).  Following Hellmann & Puri
(2000a) and Burton (1996), we distinguish between innovators and imitators. An innovator is
a firm that creates mainly new, proprietary knowledge. An imitator, on the other hand, rather
8uses existing knowledge and focuses on making (minor) improvements to it or synthesizes
several existing technologies in its own proprietary products.
Human resources include the training, experience, judgment, intelligence,
relationships, and insight of individual managers and workers in the firm. For new ventures,
the entrepreneur(s) is/are the most critical – if not the only – human capital present in the firm
(Van de Ven et al., 1984; Roberts, 1991; Shane & Stuart, 2002). His/her or their experience
and training seem to be key. Hence, we focus on the size of the entrepreneurial team and the
experience in the sector of the firm and the management experience. Next, we also take into
account whether the firm attracted professional managers with more than 10 years of
experience during the first year.
To summarize, the first research question we address in this paper is: “Can we
distinguish different starting resource configurations based on measures of three resource
dimensions: financial, technical and human?”
Key Contingencies of Starting Resource Configurations of RBSUs
Stinchcombe (1965) was one of the first to argue that environmental conditions at time
of founding strongly define the initial characteristics of an organization and that these
influences were long-lasting. Especially start-ups depend for their resources upon their
environment. In this study, we want to go beyond the notion that environment matters and
bring insights in ‘how’ environmental factors differ between different starting resource
configurations. More specifically, we study heterogeneity in technological domain,
organizational origin, and characteristics of the industry that the firm targets at founding. By
design, we control for non-measured macro-environmental factors such as the natural
environment, demographic and social structure, and overall national and international
economic conditions (see Method section). Figure 1 gives an overview of the contingencies
we address in this paper and in the following paragraphs we explain the rationale for studying
each of them.
Insert Figure 1 About Here
9Heterogeneity in technological domain
Many scholars study high tech start-ups in particular technological environments such
as biotechnology (Zahra, 1996; Clarysse, 1996; Deeds et al., 1999; Stuart et al., 1999). Others
focus on semi-conductors (Schoonhoven et al., 1990), computers (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi,
1995), or software and dot-coms (Yoffie & Cusumano, 1999; Amit & Zott, 2001). The
underlying rationale behind these technology specific studies is that the technological regime
influences to a large extent the business model a start-up can follow and the resources needed
to execute it. Hence, we expect to find different types of starting configurations in different
technological domains
Heterogeneity in organizational origin
In the study of research-based start-ups, researchers often compile samples lumping
together ventures from completely different parent institutes, without controlling for
institutional level differences. Burton et al. (2002) show that career histories and
characteristics of the prior employer influence the financing at start-up and the initial strategy
of new ventures. This finding suggests that the organizational origin influences the ability to
acquire certain types of starting resources. We aim to test the influence of prior organizational
context from which the firm emerges on starting resources. We distinguish between firms that
spun-off from a parent organization and independent start-ups. Among the parent
organizations, we make a distinction between “private corporations” and “universities”.  We
expect that we will find different starting configurations among the group of corporate spin-
offs, academic spin-offs and independent start-ups.
Heterogeneity in industry and market characteristics
Not all RBSUs develop a technology, which fits nicely into the existing industrial
environment and for which all complementary assets are in place to commercialize it. RBSUs
often have to create a new industry infrastructure and/or alter an existing industry
infrastructure to commercialize their new technologies, products or services (Utterback &
Suárez, 1993; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Many authors have stressed the collective nature of
innovative activity and pointed out that an organization is seldom solely responsible for, or
has control over, the process of innovation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rickne, 2000). Rarely does
any firm possess all the necessary resources and capabilities to create a new industry
infrastructure. Instead several actors shape the innovation process, for example through
providing resources or blocking them (Collis, 1991, p. 51; Rickne, 2000, p.12). Therefore, we
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think that the complexity in terms of different actors in the value added chain is a first
important item to characterize the industry environment of RBSUs. We could expect that
RBSUs assess the complexity which they face in their business plan and, hence, in their
starting resources. We explore then whether RBSUs with different starting configurations face
a different industrial environment, worked out in terms of complexity of the value chain.
The marketing literature indicates that the final part of the value added chain – the
buyer-seller relationship – is of outmost importance for RBSUs (Meyers & Athaide, 1991;
Loftus & Meyers, 1994). If the RBSU targets a market of corporate clients, the decision to
adopt its innovative product will usually be made jointly by numerous individuals
representing various functions and departments (Lewin & Bello, 1997). The characteristics of
such a buying center in terms of number and accessibility of decision makers, determine the
complexity of the selling process. Start-ups might organize themselves in different ways to
deal with these selling processes. In this paper, we explore whether start-ups adopt different
starting resource configurations to deal with different degrees of complexity of the buying
center of the initial targeted customers.
Several studies showed that RBSUs differ considerably in the size and geographic
dispersion of the markets they target at start-up. Some start-ups focus on a small niche market,
others target a large mass-market from inception and other RBSUs focus initially on a niche
market but have the specific intention of entering a large mass-market later on (Tiler et al.,
1993). The venture capital literature (e.g. MacMillan et al., 1985) suggests that the ability of
an RBSU to obtain risk capital is strongly related to the size and international scope of its
targeted market. In addition the international management literature (Oviatt & McDougall,
1994) suggests that start-ups that target an international market from inception might need and
have access to more and different resources than firms that do not. Hence we explore whether
firms that target different markets in terms of size and geographical scope adopt different
starting configurations to do so.
To summarize: we explore how different starting resource configurations are linked
with heterogeneity in four industry characteristics, namely the complexity of the value chain,
the complexity of the customer’s buying center, the size and geographic scope of the targeted
market.
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Heterogeneity in Entrepreneurial Orientation among Starting Resource Configurations
The reasons and motivations leading to start-up are considered important elements
influencing not only the start-up of the new business but also its characteristics (Birley &
Westhead, 1994; Hofer and Sandberg, 1987; Roberts, 1991, p. 149). Our field study revealed
that some RBSUs are founded mainly as a vehicle for self-employment, while other ventures
are rather started because the entrepreneurs saw a unique opportunity that could not be
pursued within their former work environment. This corresponds to two important dimensions
of entrepreneurial orientation, namely proactiveness and autonomy (Lumpkin and Dess,
1996). In this paper, we explore how differences in those two important aspects of
entrepreneurial orientation relate to different starting resource configurations.
METHODOLOGY
Population of RBSUs
We define “Research-Based Start-Ups” (RBSUs) as new business start-ups, which
develop and market new products or services.  “Start-up” points to the fact that firms under
study are ‘young’. We focus on RBSUs that are between five and eleven years old, which is
presumably the time it takes for a new venture to mature and to overcome its liability of
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Previous research indicates that the earliest this might occur
would be three to five years after its creation, and more usually, not until the venture is eight
to twelve years old (Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Kananjian & Drazin, 1990). “Research-based”
refers to firms that have their own R&D and/or develop their own products (Utterback and
Reitberger, 1982).
Sampling
To study how different types of resources relate to each other, it’s important to reduce
the non-measured variance among firms resulting from the environmental conditions.
Therefore, we study RBSUs in a homogeneous region. We choose Flanders, which is a small,
export-intensive economy, located in the Northern part of Belgium. Flanders is considered as
an emerging high tech region, experiencing a fast process of convergence between old and
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new technologies and thereby improving its competitive position (Cantwell & Iammarino,
2001).
We adopt a guided sampling technique to construct the sample frame of RBSUs in
Flanders, founded between 1991 and 1997. Three specific subgroups of the RBSU population
are identified to construct the sample frame. It is important to highlight that the subgroups are
not mutually exclusive, i.e. a firm can belong to one or more subgroups. We first select the
subgroup of academic spin-offs. In previous research, Clarysse et al. (2001) identified all
academic spin-offs in Belgium. Twenty-five companies in the sample frame are academic
spin-offs, which all meet the profile of RBSUs. Secondly, we select the subpopulation of
start-ups that have received risk capital from Venture Capitalists and Business Angel Funds
located in Flanders. Fifty-seven firms in these portfolios were founded between 1991 and
1997, and 18 of them met the definition of RBSUs. Only 8 of these were “new” RBSUs that
did not appear as academic spin-offs. Thirdly, we identify the group of RBSUs that have
received innovation or R&D grants from the Flemish government. One hundred eighty-two
(182) start-ups in the period 1991-1997 had received such grants. Forty-seven (47) firms met
the profile of RBSUs and 4 of these companies were already identified via other ways.
Finally, we complemented the three groups with a random sample of 480 firms, drawn from
the entire population of companies that were founded in Flanders between 1991 and 1997 and
have a NACE-code that is classified in high-tech and medium-high-tech industries according
to the OECD classification (DSTI 1997/2).  This population comprises 7775 companies in
total, of which 1861 are classified in manufacturing industries and 5914 in service sectors.
Only seven new RBSUs could by identified using this random sampling. This confirms our
intuition that the three subgroups, which we identified before represent a large part of the total
population of RBSUs and that purely relying on random sampling would be a slow and
cumbersome process to identify RBSUs.
Eighty-three (83) RBSUs1 participated in our study. At time of the data collection
(2002), the surviving RBSUs are between 5 and 11 years old. On average the RBSUs in our
sample are 7 years old. Most of the 83 firms, namely 86%, survived as independent entities.
The other 12 RBSUs (14%) dissolved, i.e. failed to exist as independent entities, by 2002.
Half of these, i.e. 7% of the total sample were acquired by other firms during their early
growth path and the other 7% went bankrupt.  During the first year after founding the number
of employees (in full time equivalents) ranged between 0 and 305, with an average of 8
                                                                
1 Due to missing data, only 76 firms are used in the cluster analysis
13
employees during the first year. In 2002, the number of full time employees ranged between 1
and 520, with an average of 33 employees.
Data Collection
The primary data source is a structured questionnaire with mainly closed questions.
This questionnaire is conducted during face-to-face interviews with the founder of the
company. The founders or CEO’s were targeted because they typically possess the most
comprehensive knowledge on the organization’s history, the firm’s strategy, and its
performance (Carter et al., 1994). The interviews typically have duration of one hour to one
hour and a half and are conducted by two researchers. One of the interviewers asks the
questions and the other person fills in the questionnaire and takes notes. Immediately after the
interview, the researchers crosscheck facts and impressions. Next to the collection of primary
data, we double-check the financial data (e.g. revenues, capital, subsidies, loans, profits) with
data available via the National Bank of Belgium and/ or company balance sheets. These
audited data sources enhance the reliability of the measures. Finally, we collected additional
information on each firm from secondary data sources such as web sites, company brochures,
newsletters and press releases.
Starting Resources: Measures and Descriptive Statistics
In the theoretical section we elaborated the resource-based view of the firm in the
context of RBSUs. We argued that 10 variables along three resource dimensions, namely
technology, financial and human resources, are appropriate to describe the resource-base of
RBSUs at founding. Table 1 describes how these 10 variables are measured.
Insert Table 1 About Here
All variables are based on specific questions in the questionnaire and are thus rated by
the interviewee, except for the measures of technical scope and innovativeness.  The two
interviewers scored these variables based on the qualitative information obtained during the
interview and additional information about products and technology from secondary sources.
When consensus could not be reached a third experienced researcher was asked to review the
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interview reports and other information and score the variable. We choose to score these
variables ourselves because these variables are less factual than the other items and founders
lack a frame of reference when asked to evaluate the innovativeness and scope of their basic
technology. We believe that researcher-based scoring improves the consistency of these
measures. Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the resource variables.
Insert Table 2 About Here
Key Contingencies and Entrepreneurial Orientation: Measures and Descriptive
Statistics
Table 3 describes how the 6 contingency variables and entrepreneurial orientation are
measured. Table 4 gives the descriptive statistics of these measures. Firstly, we look at the
heterogeneity in the technological domain. Table 4 shows that our sample contains
considerably more software firms (49%).
Insert Table 3 and 4 About Here
This might limit our ability to pronounce upon the link between technology and
starting configuration.  Secondly, we study the heterogeneity in organizational origin. More
specifically, we distinguish between RBSUs that spun-off from universities or research
institutes, RBSUs that spun-off form private companies and firms without a link with a parent
organization, i.e. independent start-ups. These three types of firms are equally represented in
our sample. Thirdly, we study the heterogeneity in industry characteristics. More specifically,
we study the heterogeneity in the size and geographic scope of the target market at founding.
These variables are scored by the founder during the interviews. Next, we developed
measures for the complexity of the value added chain that the firm faces and the complexity
of the selling process to the direct customer of the firm. The two researchers who interviewed
all the firms scored these two variables using all the qualitative information from the
interviews and secondary data and taking into account the other RBSUs as a frame of
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reference to code each individual firm.  Finally, the entrepreneurial orientation to start the
company is measured with two items, autonomy and proactiveness. These variables are scored
by the founder on a 5-point scale in a telephone follow-up interview. Due to the present low
response rate2 of these follow-up interviews, we also use a dummy, which measures the main
motivation for founding the firm. This variable is scored by two researchers based on the
answers to the first open-ended question in which the founder was asked to talk about how the
firm was started.
Cluster Analysis
We explore which different types of starting resource configurations can be
distinguished among RBSUs by use of cluster analysis. Cluster analysis encompasses a
number of different classification algorithms, which can be classified into two broad families:
hierarchical and non-hierarchical clustering. Ketchen & Shook (1996) suggest using both
procedures as complements to each other: first a hierarchical procedure can be used as an
exploratory methodology to determine the desired number of clusters and as input to the non-
hierarchical step. In this paper, we follow this two-step approach.  To perform the hierarchical
cluster analysis, we follow Ward’s procedure with squared Euclidean distance as linkage
measures (Hambrick, 1983). As inputs in the cluster analysis, we used the different measures
of technological, financial and human resources described above. Following the criteria of
Hair et al. (1992), we find a four clusters solution as the most appropriate for our data.
Subsequently, we performed a k-means clustering with four as the predefined number of
clusters and the same variables as inputs.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Starting Resource Configurations
The F-statistic of the analysis of variance and the descriptive statistics for each cluster
are given in table 5.  We found that all variables were significant at the 0.05 level or better.
The cluster characteristics are discussed below. For ease of interpretation, we have given each
cluster a name, which reflects the starting resource configuration of the companies in the
cluster.
                                                                
2 At time of writing, the telephone follow-up is ongoing and more data points are forthcoming
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Insert Table 5 About Here
CLUSTER 1 (14 firms or 18.4%) corresponds to the Venture Capital (VC) backed
start-ups extensively described in the financial literature (e.g. Manigart et al., 2002; Hellmann
& Puri, 2000a). In contrast to all other categories, these RBSUs start up with external capital,
either from institutional VCs, or corporations. They usually have a proprietary, innovative
technology that can be used for different applications (platform), but at start up they are far
from a market ready product. They usually have a large founding team, on average consisting
of three founders. The average founding team of VC-backed start-ups has high management
experience but low experience in the sector of the firm. VC-backed start-ups often attract
experienced managers during the first year after founding.
CLUSTER 2 (15 firm or 19.7%) represents the prospectors. Comparable to the VC-
backed start-ups, prospectors are in an early stage of product development at founding, on
average in the a-prototype stage or earlier. Prospectors as a group seem however to be less
innovative and less involved with platform technologies than VC-backed start-ups. The
average size of the founding team is comparable to that of VC-backed start-ups, but
prospectors have less management experience and none of them attracted experienced
managers during the first year after founding. This seems to be related to the fact that
prospectors are on average started with smaller amounts of starting capital than the VC-
backed start-ups. Hence, prospectors mostly don’t have the financial resources to attract
experienced managers. None of the firms in the prospector group received venture capital at
start-up, neither from an institutional VC nor a corporate one.
CLUSTER 3 (18 firms or 23.7%) represents the product start-ups. In contrast to the
other groups, product start-ups usually have a product that is close to market in a first version
at time of founding. As a group the product start-ups are less involved with platform and
innovative technologies than VC-backed firms but more than the prospectors. The typical
product start-up consists of one or two entrepreneurs, who have been working in the sector for
a number of years. The management experience of the founding team is low and only few
product start-ups attract experienced managers during the first year. At start-up, most product
start-ups do not look for external capital because they expect revenues from product sales
shortly after founding. Their working capital seems to be financed with a high degree of debts
during the first year.
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CLUSTER 4 (29 RBSUs or 38.2%) represents the transitional start-ups. These firms
started as technical consultants without a concrete product idea. Typically, transitional start-
ups started as one or two-person companies. The entrepreneurs have a lot of experience in a
particular domain and founded the firm to commercialize their expertise. These companies are
selected in our sample because later on they evolved into a product-oriented company.
However, at start, most of these companies are focused upon the service aspect. Transitional
start-ups are started with small amounts of money and without venture capital and have high
debt ratio during the first year.
The cluster analysis renders four different types of starting configurations among
RBSUs. The first category, the VC-backed RBSUs are described extensively in the finance
literature (Manigart et al., 2002; Hellmann & Puri, 2000a). Whereas this literature takes the
fact that VC-backed firms are a different category of companies as a point of departure, we
find indeed that these companies also differ in terms of human and technical resources. Our
analysis indicates that venture capital financing is related to broad and innovative
technologies and larger founding teams with more management experience. VC-backed firms
are also more likely to attract experienced managers during the first year. The finance
literature tends to treat the non-VC backed RBSUs as a homogeneous category. However, our
analysis shows that the non-VC backed category is much more heterogeneous. We found
three types of RBSUs that start without venture capital and also differ significantly in their
other resources. We labeled these three types as the prospectors, the product start-ups and the
transitional starters.
The transitional start-ups tend to be founded by entrepreneurs who commercialize
their technical knowledge or skills rather than a proprietary technology. The founding
characteristics of these start-ups correspond to those of the “life-style” oriented SMEs, the
traditional SME and the family-owned SME described by other researchers (Birley &
Westhead, 1994). This group of start-ups seems to grow very slowly over time or do not grow
at all (Roberts, 1991; Autio & Yli-Renko, 1998). Maintaining ownership and creating income
for the founder and its family are more important than growth for most of these companies
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Several researchers report that the technical consultants comprise
the majority of high tech start-ups, spin-outs or new technology based firms. Roberts (1991,
pp. 166 – 170) points out that a large number of the technical consultant start-ups get stuck in
their consulting mode and never evolve into a company with tangible products. We only
selected the technical consultants that made the transition to a product-oriented company over
the first 5 to 11 years of their life cycle.  However, these transitional start-ups remain the
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largest group in our sample (33%), which indicates that the technical consultancy business
model is a prevalent starting resource configuration for RBSUs.
The prospectors and product start-ups can be seen as two hybrid types of starting
resource configurations. The idea of a “hybrid” type of firm showing characteristics of VC-
backed and technical consultants was first launched by Tiler et al. (1993) and later on
confirmed by Clarysse et al. (2001) and Degroof (2002) in a study of academic spin-offs.
These studies observed a category of start-ups that did not grow in the first years, but started
to growth later on. They also mentioned that although these companies did not show growth
in the first years, they were started with a specific aim to grow later on. In this study we find
two hybrid types of firms based on their starting resources. The starting configuration of the
product start-ups is very similar to the one of transitional starters in terms of human, and
financial resources but they differ considerably in their technical resources. Product start-ups
have a close to market product, which they either commercialize in a small niche or use as a
back office tool for customized consulting services. The second hybrid group is the prospector
group. As the typical VC-backed RBSU, prospectors start with a product in a very early
development stage. However, the qualitative insights from the interviews teach us that
prospectors have a less clear idea about the market they want to address than VC-backed start-
ups. At founding the base technology of prospectors is less clear and, as a group, prospectors
seem to be involved with less broad and less innovative technologies. As a result prospectors
do not (or are unable to) raise venture capital and start on a smaller scale than VC-backed
companies. They have, however, the intention to fasten their growth later on.
KEY CONTINGENCIES OF STARTING RESOURCE CONFIGURATIONS
Heterogeneity in technological domain
To test the association between the variation in technological segment and resource
configurations, we perform chi-square tests (See Table 6).
Insert Table 6 About Here
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Overall, we find that technological segments do not differ significantly between
clusters for software (p=0.183), telecom (p=0.722), and other domains (p=0.661). Only
among the transitional start-ups we observe 3.9 times more software start-ups than would be
expected. One explanation for this might be that in the early- and mid-nineties large
companies started to outsource their IT departments. As a result, a number of start-ups were
created which provided services to these large firms. Firms active in medical-related
technologies do differ significantly between clusters (p=0.006). These companies are less
represented in the transitional starters and more in the product start-ups.   However, the
number of medical related companies in our sample is too low (13%) to draw strong
conclusions based on these statistics.
Heterogeneity in organizational origin
To test the link between organizational origin, i.e. academic or corporate spin-out or
independent start-up, and starting resource configuration, we calculate Pearson Chi-square
statistics (See Table 7). We find that academic spin-offs are significantly more represented in
the clusters of the VC-backed start-ups, prospectors and product start-ups.
Insert Table 7 About Here
The number of corporate spin-offs, on the other hand, is significantly higher among
the group of transitional starters. Hence, our data indicate that the organizational origin differs
significantly between different types of starting resource configurations. Employees that work
in a large corporation are more likely to start up as technical consulting firm, which may make
the transition to product-oriented companies later on. This might be partly explained by the
fact that in the early and mid-nineties, corporate venturing in Flanders was not known at all.
Instead, corporate spin-offs most often resulted from restructuring or outsourcing activities.
Most of the corporate spin-offs are based on personal technical skills or know-how of the
entrepreneur(s).  Academic spin-offs on the other hand are more often based on a (patented)
technology developed at the university, which is mostly formally transferred to the start-up.
Hence, academic spin-outs mostly have a strong and proprietary technical base, which makes
them interesting investment opportunities for venture capitalists. The prevalence of academic
spin-outs among the hybrid prospectors is also noteworthy. In the early and mid-nineties the
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technology transfer offices in the Flemish universities did not offer extensive support to
finance, structure and professionalize its spin-out companies. As a result many academic spin-
outs in this period started as prospectors, i.e. firms that start with limited amounts of financing
and with an early stage technology for which the product market was not clear at founding but
which have the specific intention to become a high growth company later on.
Heterogeneity in industry characteristics
To study the heterogeneity in industry characteristics among different starting
configurations, we used the Kruskal-Wallis statistic (see Table 8).
Insert Table 8 About Here
We found that the complexity of the value chain differs significantly between clusters
(p=0.002). More specifically, we found that VC-backed start-ups face a significantly more
complex value chain than the other three groups. One explanation may be that due to a
complex value chain these firms need more resources to bridge the gap between product
development and market sales. Alternatively, it might be that more complex value chains are
associated with more ambitious projects with potential higher returns (and higher risk), which
are more attractive to risk capital investors.
Next, we find no significant differences in the complexity of the buying center
between the four clusters (p=0.237). Although not significant, we observe that VC-backed
start-ups face a more complex sales process than the three other groups of firms. They mostly
sell complex and expensive products/ services in a business-to-business context and have to
deal with multiple decision makers inside the customer organization.
Estimated market size and geographic scope at start-up differ significantly among the
four clusters (p<0.001 for both). Especially the difference between VC-backed and product
start-ups is noteworthy. Product start-ups tend to start in a specific small niche market, which
is usually global or at least European. VC-backed start-ups on the other hand tend to target
mainstream markets of a much larger size and are international from the start. This confirms
that large and international markets are attractive to investors or alternatively that start-ups
need sufficient financial resources in order to penetrate a large and international market. The
transitional start-ups target a small and local market.
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Heterogeneity in entrepreneurial orientation
Finally, we tested the difference of the entrepreneurial orientation between the
different clusters. Firstly, we use our self-scored dummy, which indicates the main motivation
to found the company. The Pearson Chi-square statistic shows that clusters differ significantly
in their main motivation (p<0.001). Not surprisingly, the entrepreneurs that started a company
mainly because they had recognized a concrete opportunity were most prevalent among the
VC-backed start-ups. In line with this, we find significantly more self-employment driven
entrepreneurs among the transitional starters.  Next, we use the founder-coded scales for the
importance of self-employment (autonomy) and anticipation of a concrete opportunity
(proactiveness) to start the firm (KW-tests see Table 9).
Insert Table 9 About Here
The clusters do not differ significantly in the importance of self-employment to start
the firm (p=0.312). Clearly, being independent is a main driver for almost every entrepreneur
irrespective of the type of firm he starts. The importance of the recognition of a concrete
opportunity as a main driver to start the firm does differ significantly among the clusters
(p=0.004). More specifically, we found that VC-backed start-ups score significantly higher on
the proactiveness scale than the other groups and transitional start-ups score significantly
lower.
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Conclusions. In this study, we present a resource-based typology of RBSUs.
Typologies are useful tools because they sharpen our analytical thinking and label variation
and they are a way to meaningfully capture the complexity of organizational reality. Most
prior research on RBSUs does not control for possible interaction effects between different
types of resources in studying the link between resources and firm performance. Conner
(1991) argues, however, that the return to a resource is dependent on its relationship to other
resources held by the firm so that, if a resource is more specialized to other resources, it may
22
yield higher returns. Hence, without a deep understanding about resource typologies, it is
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions and recommendations from research on RBSUs.
In this paper, we study the financial, technical and human resources of RBSUs. Our
cluster analysis indicates that based on these resources, we can distinguish four types of
RBSUs. We labeled these different types of starting resource configurations as “VC-backed
start-ups”, “prospectors”, “product start-ups”, and “transitional start-ups”. These different
types of starting resource configurations are empirically distinct and conceptually
comprehensible. Hence, this study shows that there is no such thing as the typical RBSU.
Rather, there are different types of RBSUs with different starting resource configurations. We
found that raising venture capital goes hand in hand with a broad and innovative technology
and larger founding teams with more management experience. VC-backed start-ups are also
more likely to attract experienced managers during the first year. This in contrast to the
prospector companies, which lack a broad innovative and proprietary technology in which
VCs tend to be interested. Without a strong technical base, no external capital can be collected
although their business model might imply the need for such capital. They are also not able to
attract experienced management. This indicates that more of one type of resources leads to
more of another and vice versa.
Thirty-three percent of the companies that today bring an innovative product on the
market, never intended to do so at start-up. We called them “transitional starters”. These firms
changed their business model from a purely consulting to a product oriented one. It would be
interesting to analyze which factors have lead to a change in business model and whether this
change has lead to successful performance. Our qualitative data shows that the venture capital
society, which was mushrooming in the mid-nineties, played an important role. This suggests
that availability of capital conducts strategy.
We also found that more of one resource does not necessarily lead to more of another.
For instance, start-ups with a concrete market-ready product are typically founded by
experienced entrepreneurs, who choose to finance their working capital with debts rather than
venture capital. The desired amount of capital needed seems to be much less than among the
VC-backed. This means that the relationships between different types of resources go beyond
a simple correlation metric. Not only leads more of one to more of another type, but also a
different composition of one type of resources is linked to a different composition of the
other. We think that the insights in starting resources and our typology are a first step towards
a better understanding starting resources and the relationships between them.
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We also found that starting resources are systematically related to non-resource
factors. More specifically, we found that the starting resource configurations are linked to the
firms’ history in terms of the parent institute that spun off the firm. The emergence of pro-
active technology transfer policies at universities is reflected in the prevalence of academic
spin-outs among the prospectors (Clarysse et al., 2003). Also, spin-outs from corporations
have significantly different starting configurations as their academic equivalents. Previous
research has looked at the effect of institutional structures and policies on the patenting and
licensing of research organizations and laboratories, however the institutional imprinting of a
parent institute on the venturing process and its starting configuration has largely remained an
unexplored theme.
Next to the institutional link, also heterogeneity in the characteristics of the industry
that the firm targets at start-up is linked to different starting resource configurations. This
finding contributes to the ongoing debate in strategic management literature on this interplay.
The study confirms the findings in the VC literature that VCs tend to invest in start-ups,
which target mainstream, international markets of a significant size. VCs also take risks. They
invest in companies that face a very complex sales process and an interrelated value chain.
Product start-ups also target an international or at least European market, but in a specific
niche. Our data show that these companies start without venture capital either because VCs do
not want to invest in these companies or because they simply do not look for external capital.
Finally, transitional starters target a very local market. There is thus ample evidence that there
exists at least an interaction between the characteristics of the targeted market and the starting
configuration.
Limitations. The study has several limitations. Firstly, we have a limited population of
76 useful responses. Therefore, a more complex analysis such as a logistic multinomial
regression is not possible. This kind of analysis should allow us to test the predictive power of
the different explanatory variables simultaneously. Hence, the results reported in this paper
remain first indications, which should be tested in larger samples in the future. Secondly, our
study only contains data on Flemish RBSUs. We deliberately choose a small geographic
coverage in order to reduce the influence of non-measured variance in our study. The trade-
off, however, is that one might question the external validity of this region and our findings.
Future research in other regions is needed to test the existence and prevalence of the different
starting resource configurations. However, we think that the Flemish region is very
comparable to most emerging and developing high tech regions. Therefore, we believe that
the external validity of this study is probably higher than studies focusing on highly developed
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and unique high tech environments such as Silicon Valley and Boston. A third limitation is
that our study relies on retrospective data. Several scholars argue that such data can impose
bias because the respondents’ lack of trust-worthiness especially when the time lags between
date of interview and the questioned period increases. This type of bias is one of the most
difficult to overcome in entrepreneurship research. However, to reduce such problems, we
crosschecked the information obtained from the founder(s) as much as possible with publicly
available data (websites, company brochures, business plans, and database of the national
bank of Belgium). Next, most of the founder-scored data are factual. The more qualitative,
subjective measures (e.g. innovativeness) are rated by the researchers, which use the other
firms in the sample as a frame of reference.  Finally, we try to deal with survival bias by
including survivors as well as dissolved firms in the sample and by studying firms that are
between 5 and 11 years old, which is a much earlier stage than do most other databases.
Research directions. This study is a first step in a better understanding of how and why
firms differ in their starting resources. Future research should study the validity of the four
types of starting resource configurations in different regional environments and in larger
samples. Next, future research should address the path dependencies of the RBV (David,
1985; Arthur, 1988). Stinchcombe (1965), Van de Ven et al. (1984) and others argue that the
early development of organizations has profound influence on what they subsequently
become. Hence, an interesting direction for future research would be to explore how these
different types of firms evolve during their early growth path. The ultimate test of the
proposed taxonomy will be to test its accuracy in the prediction of growth, evolution of
resources and performance of firms. Finally, strategy scholars argue that the return of a
resource is likely to be dependent on the environment, and the fit between the resource,
environment and strategy. Future research should explore this relationship in more detail.
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TABLE 1
Starting resource variables used to derive a resource-based taxonomy of RBSUs
Category Description Interpretation
Technology Stage of development of core product
(StageNPD)
Ranging from no a-prototype, over a-
prototype, b-prototype to a market-ready
product at founding (Scaled 0 – 3)
Scope of product/ technology Dummy: 1 indicating that the firm develops
a platform serving as the base for several
products; 0 otherwise
Innovativeness Dummy: 1 indicating that firm creates
mainly new, proprietary knowledge
(innovator); 0 firm rather uses existing
knowledge and focuses on minor
improvements to it or synthesizes several
existing technologies (imitator)
Financial Capital Amount (Euro); For the cluster analysis the
original capital variable is rescaled into 7
financial classes: <1k; 1k – 10k; 10k – 50k;
50k – 100k; 100k – 250k; 250k – 500k; and
> 500k
Debt Ratio Ratio between loans plus other debts and
capital (Log Amounts in Euro)
VC Dummy: 1 indicating that the firm raised
capital from institutional risk capital
investors during the first year; 0 otherwise
Human Team size Number of founders
Management experience Highest level of management experience of
one of the founders ranging from low (less
than 3 years); over medium (3 to 6 years) to
high (more than 6 years) (Scaled 1 – 3)
Sector experience Highest level of sector experience of one of
the founders ranging from low (less than 3
years); over medium (3 to 6 years) to high
(more than 6 years) (Scaled 1 – 3)
Hired Guns Dummy: 1 indicating that professional
managers with more than 10 years of
experience were hired during the first year;
0 otherwise
34
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for the Resource Variables
Variables N Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD
Technology
1. Stage NPD 80 1.062 1 0 3 1.173
2. Scope 79 0.190 0 0 1 0.395
3. Innovativeness 79 0.367 0 0 1 0.485
Financial
4a. Capital 79 358 328 51 973 100 6 000 000 1 012 899
4b. Financial Class 80 3.95 4 1 7 1.713
5. Debt ratio 79 1.678 1.775 0 2.739 0.622
6. VC dummy 80 0.150 0 0 1 0.359
Human
7. TeamSize 80 2.200 2 0 7 1.436
8. SectorExp 77 1.948 2 1 3 0.944
9. ManagExp 77 1.416 1 1 3 0.767
10. Hired Guns 80 0.088 0 0 1 0.284
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TABLE 3
Variables measuring key contingencies and entrepreneurial orientation
Category Description Interpretation
Technological
Domain
Technological segment in which the firm
is active
Following the International Patent
Classification System and aggregating
firms into 4 main classes: Software,
Telecom, Medical-related and Others*
Organizational
Origin
Academic Spin-off, Corporate Spin-off or
Independent Start-Up
Three dummies with 1 indicating that the
firm is an academic or corporate spin-off
of independent start-up; 0 otherwise
Industry
Characteristics
Complexity of value chain The firms dependence on other players to
develop complementary products or
services so that the focal firm’s product or
service has value for the end customer
(Scaled –1 to +2; with -1 = munificent
value chain; 0 = all technology and
complementary assets are available in
house or can be built up at a relative low
cost;  +1 = the company does not have all
technology or complementary assets to
bring a product to the market but its
negotiation strength is equal to that of the
other parties; +2 = the company needs to
deal with several large and complicated
parties such as large organizations or
government firms in order to further
develop and commercialize its
technology)
Complexity of buying center Complexity of selling process to the
firm’s direct customer taking into account
the number of decision makers and the
difficulty of locating and accessing them;
scored as easy, moderate and difficult
(Scaled 0 – 2, with 0 = one decision
maker, whom the focal firm can easily
approach. +1 = different decision makers
but they are rather easy to locate and
approach;  +2: different decision makers
which are difficult to identify (e.g.
because the customers organization is very
complex) or approach (e.g. at a high
hierarchical level or located in corporate
headquarters abroad)
Market Size Size of the targeted market at founding
ranging from niche, over temporary niche
with specific intention to penetrate larger
market later on, to large market (Scaled 1
– 3)
Geographic Scope Geographic coverage of market ranging
from local focus, over European/
international to worldwide/global (Scaled
1 – 3)
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Entrepreneurial
Orientation
Autonomy Importance of being self-employed (urge
for autonomy) in the decision to start this
company (Scaled 1 – 5, with 1 = not
important at all and 5 = very important)
Proactiveness Importance of the anticipation of a
concrete new opportunity in the decision
to start this firm (Scaled 1 – 5, with 1 =
not important at all and 5 = very
important)
Main motivation for starting the company Dummy: 0 indicating that self-
employment related arguments (i.e. loss of
job, willingness to work independently…)
were the most important reason; 1 if
recognition of a concrete opportunity was
more important to start the company
* A detailed description of the classification procedure can be obtained from the first author
upon request.
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TABLE 4
Descriptive statistics for key contingency variables and entrepreneurial orientation
Variables N Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD
Technology Domain
Software 80 0.488 0 0 1 0.503
Telecom 80 0.150 0 0 1 0.359
Medical related 80 0.125 0 0 1 0.333
Other 80 0.238 0 0 1 0.428
Organizational Origin
Academic Spin-Out 80 0.313 0 0 1 0.466
Corporate Spin-Out 80 0.313 0 0 1 0.466
Independent Start-Up 80 0.375 0 0 1 0.487
Industry Characteristics
Value Chain 79 0.380 0 -1 2 0.756
Buying Center 79 1.013 1 0 2 0.810
Market Size 79 1.557 1 1 3 0.780
Geographic Scope 79 1.873 2 1 3 0.774
Entrepreneurial
Orientation
Autonomy 53 3.660 4 1 5 1.255
Proactiveness 53 3.755 4 1 5 1.191
Main Motivation dummy 80 0.466 0 0 1 0.502
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TABLE 5
Profile of Starting Resource Clusters (Means and Standard Deviations): Results of
Cluster Analysis
Dimension VC-backed
start-ups
Prospector
s
Product
start-ups
Transitional
start-ups
F (sig.)
Technology
Stage NPD 0.714
(0.914)
0.733
(0.961)
2.667
(0.594)
0.345
(0.553)
40.398****
(<0.001)
Scope 0.500
(0.519)
0.067
(0.258)
0.278
(0.461)
0.069
(0.258)
5.167***
(0.002)
Innovativeness 0.786
(0.426)
0.200
(0.414)
0.444
(0.511)
0.172
(0.384)
7.320****
(<0.001)
Financial
Financial class 6.714
(0.469)
3.133
(1.061)
4.111
(1.231)
2.862
(0.915)
53.689****
(<0.001)
Debt ratio 1.284
(0.570)
1.577
(0.675)
1.614
(0.561)
1.918
(0.585)
3.809**
(0.014)
VC dummy 0.786
(0.426)
0.000
(0.000)
0.056
(0.236)
0.000
(0.000)
49.457****
(<0.001)
Human
Team Size 3.143
(1.791)
3.867
(0.915)
1.556
(0.784)
1.379
(0.494)
27.495****
(<0.001)
Sector Exp 1.571
(0.937)
1.533
(0.743)
2.278
(0.958)
2.138
(0.953)
3.016**
(0.035)
Management
Exp
2.000
(1.038)
1.133
(0.516)
1.222
(0.548)
1.414
(0.733)
4.212***
(0.008)
Hired Guns 0.357
(0.497)
0.000
(0.000)
0.111
(0.323)
0.000
(0.000)
6.554****
(0.001)
Cluster Size 14 15 18 29 76
Levels of significance: ** = .05 ; *** = .01 ; **** = .001
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TABLE 6
Heterogeneity in technological domain in the different clusters: Observed minus
expected frequencies and Pearson Chi-square test of significance
Technological
domain
VC-backed
start-ups
Prospector
s
Product
start-ups
Transitiona
l start-ups
Pearson Chi-
square (sig)
Software -1.816 0.697 -2.763 3.882 4.850
(0.183)
Telecom 0.789 -1.368 0.158 0.421 1.330
(0.722)
Medical related 0.342 -0.776 3.868 -3.434 12.324***
(0.006)
Other 0.684 1.447 -1.263 -0.868 1.592
(0.661)
Levels of significance: ** = .05 ; *** = .01 ; **** = .001
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TABLE 7
Heterogeneity in organizational origin in the different clusters: Observed minus
expected frequencies and Pearson Chi-square test of significance
Origin VC-backed
start-ups
Prospector
s
Product
start-ups
Transitiona
l start-ups
Pearson Chi-
square (sig)
Academic spin-
out
2.579 1.263 2.579 -6.157 10.128**
(0.018)
Independent
start-up
0.947 -0.342 -1.21 0.605 0.807
(0.847)
Corporate spin-
out
-3.52 -0.921 -1.105 5.552 8.689**
(0.033)
Levels of significance: ** = .05 ; *** = .01 ; **** = .001
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TABLE 8
Means and standard deviations for the business environment variables in each cluster
and the Kruskal-Wallis test of significance
Variables VC-backed
start-ups
Prospector
s
Product
start-ups
Transitiona
l start-ups
Kruskal-Wallis
(sig)
Value Chain 1.07
(0.497)
0.20
(0.774)
0.17
(0.514)
0.27
(0.648)
15.321***
(0.002)
Buying Center 1.42
(0.646)
0.80
(0.774)
1.05
(0.872)
1.10
(0.859)
4.241
(0.237)
Market Size 2.29
(0.726)
1.33
(0.617)
1.38
(0.777)
1.38
(0.676)
17.300****
(<0.001)
Geographic
Scope
2.64
(0.497)
1.80
(0.774)
1.94
(0.725)
1.52
(0.687)
19.677 ****
(<0.001)
Levels of significance: ** = .05 ; *** = .01 ; **** = .001
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TABLE 9
Means and standard deviations for two measures of the entrepreneurial orientation at
start-up – autonomy and proactiveness –  in each cluster and the Kruskal-Wallis test of
significance
Variables VC-backed
start-ups
Prospector
s
Product
start-ups
Transitiona
l start-ups
Kruskal-Wallis
(sig)
Autonomy 3.64
(1.03)
3.15
(1.28)
3.75
(1.35)
3.94
(1.34)
3.569
(0.312)
Proactiveness 4.09
(0.83)
4.54
(0.87)
3.67
(1.07)
2.94
(1.34)
13.466***
(0.004)
Levels of significance: ** = .05 ; *** = .01 ; **** = .001
